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Justin Kauffman, History, Lehigh University  
Abstract of Master’s Thesis, Submitted August 15, 2014: 
The aim of this thesis is to examine a conflict of Communist politics in the last 
pre-Nazi years of Germany’s Weimar Republic through the photomontages of 
Communist Party member John Heartfield. The research investigates a moment when a 
radical Communist artist sacrificed his commitment to party line to reach the leftist 
masses with his propaganda. 
In the first part of the thesis, a background on Heartfield is provided to in order to 
present a trajectory leading up to his propaganda work for the Die Arbeiter-Illustrierte-
Zeitung (AIZ or Worker’s Illustrated Magazine). Following this background, the 
discussion delves into an analysis of the photomontage in 1930 and 1931 starting with a 
brief comparison to election posters of the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands 
(Communist Party of Germany or KPD). This section uses the photomontage visuals and 
articles written about the medium in order to outline the aesthetic and practical value of 
the photomontage as an appealing, widespread form of propaganda. In the final part of 
the thesis, an analysis of Heartfield’s photomontages from July 1932 until February 1933 
is presented along with the context of political conflict in the KPD. This section starts by 
exploring the moment in July 1932 when Heartfield went against the KPD party line with 
a montage that proposed a united front coalition with Social Democrats.  
In conclusion, the thesis argues that Heartfield’s decision to go against party line 
contributed to the political conflict among German Communists in 1932. Heartfield was 
willing to undermine short-term changes in KPD policy for the immediate need of 
reaching his broad audience with what he considered the correct political message.  
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Figure 1. Die letze Weisheit der SPD: “Nieder mit dem Marxismus!”, 1931. 
John Heartfield’s last piece that appeared in Die Arbeiter-Illustrierte-Zeitung 
(AIZ or Worker’s Illustrated Magazine) in 1931 was the one shown above. The sarcastic 
work titled “Die letzte Weisheit der SPD: ‘Nieder mit dem Marximus!’” (The Final 
Wisdom of the SPD: “Down with Marxism”) contained an image of Karl Marx being 
apprehended by the Weimar police. Willhelm Sollmann, a Social Democrat from Köln, 
could be seen on the right wearing a police helmet and grabbing Marx by the arm (Figure 
1).1 Heartfield altered a line directly from The Communist Manifesto for the piece, 
saying, “Wir haben nicht unsere Ketten zu verlieren, sondern unsere Futterkrippen und 
                                                
1 Figure 1. John Heartfield, Die letze Weisheit der SPD: “Nieder mit dem Marxismus!,” AIZ 10, no. 27 
(1931), in John Heartfield, John Heartfield, AIZ - Arbeiter-Illustrierte Zeitung, Volks Illustrierte, 1930-38, 
ed. David Evans and Anna Lundgreen (New York: Kent Fine Art, 1992), 73. From this point forward, 
when a shortened footnote reads “Heartfield, Heartfield,” it is referring to the secondary introduction of the 
photomontage compilation written by David Evans or the supplemental analysis that accompanies each 
montage. Shortened footnotes that read “Heartfield,” with a German-language title are referring to the 
photomontages themselves, also found in this compilation. When “in Heartfield, Heartfield” appears at the 
end of a full footnote, it is referring to the place that the actual photomontage can be found in the above 
compilation.  
 3 
Ministersessel” (We have not our chains to lose, but our feeding troughs and ministers’ 
seats).2 This piece was an aggressively cynical criticism of the Sozialdemokratische 
Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany or SPD). Examining 
propaganda like this at the height of the late Weimar crisis provides the historian with a 
window into the political contradictions of the Communist left that reached their 
culmination in the summer of 1932; the piece was attacking the SPD, a political party that 
many of its viewers belonged to. This discrepancy between readership and bitingly 
sarcastic propaganda is a paradox that needs to be explored further. 
This visual form was an application of the photomontage, an artistic medium that 
had been explored by modernists after World War I and into the 1920s. The term 
“photomontage” was first used by the Berlin Dadaists to refer to “their collages of printed 
ephemera and photographic fragments.”3 This piece follows these aesthetic patterns, as 
the images of Marx, Sollman, and the police are all cutouts from separate publications; 
Heartfield juxtaposed them in one piece to make this politically aggressive statement 
about the SPD.  
This image is also striking, because the AIZ had a significant SPD-based 
readership. The illustrated magazine was known for targeting a mass base audience of 
Berlin’s leftist parties, and now, for the first time, it was using this montage form to reach 
this readership with aggressive propaganda.  
The photomontage above is reflective of the struggle in Die Internationale 
Arbeiter-Hilfe (International Workers’ Aid or IAH) during the late Weimar years to 
reconcile the popularity of Heartfield’s artistic innovations in its propaganda with 
                                                
2 Heartfield, Heartfield, 72. 
3 Heartfield, Heartfield, 10.  
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political allegiance to the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (Communist Party of 
Germany or KPD). Similar to this image, Heartfield’s photomontages in the AIZ from 
1930 through the end of the Weimar Republic were driven by conscious efforts to shape 
politics with this growing montage form. In fact, Heartfield had always prioritized the 
political function of the art over the art itself. As an active member in the Berlin Dada 
movement, Heartfield rejected the concept of art form as a facet of bourgeois experience 
accessible to only the upper classes.4 Heartfield yearned for a differentiated art that would 
reach a larger audience and convince them of the value in Communist doctrine. His 
artistic inclinations combined with his desire to make a political impact on the leftist 
masses led him to the AIZ in 1929. With this magazine, he could produce art that was not 
only cheap and accessible but would spread to a broad viewership. His work for the AIZ 
was not displayed in art exhibitions that charged an entry fee. The originals were those 
printed in the illustrated weekly and circulated all around Berlin by the IAH.  
The IAH occupied a particular niche in its relation to the KPD. The Communist 
International (Comintern) originally organized it in 1921 as a relief organization for 
starving workers in Russia. In this fashion, it used propaganda, such as film shorts and 
illustrated pamphlets, to spread awareness about the suffering in the Soviet Union.5 
Shortly thereafter, it became an independent propaganda organization associated with 
Germany’s Communist Party. Willi Münzenberg, the leader of the IAH, expanded the 
IAH’s network and started several cultural organizations, including the AIZ, which were 
all funded and controlled by the propaganda organization. He repeatedly clarified that the 
                                                
4 Beth Irwin Lewis, “Grosz/Heartfield: The Artist as Social Critic,” in Grosz/Heartfield: The Artist as 
Social Critic, October 1 – November 8, 1980 (Minneapolis: University Gallery, 1980), 27.  
5 Bruce Murray, Film and the German Left in the Weimar Republic: From Cagliari to Kuhle Wampe 
(Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1990), 52.  
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IAH was an independent organization, which would endorse the KPD’s politics but 
would remain autonomous in its own right.6 In 1929, Heartfield began producing artwork 
for Münzenberg and the IAH and gained access to the broad leftist readership that the 
propaganda organization had already built. As a Dadaist artist, Heartfield’s modernist 
sensibility led him to seek out large audiences to effect with his art, and after 1929, he 
reached a wider audience than most artists in the Berlin avant-garde could even claim.  
As well, 1929 was a crucial year because of official changes in KPD policy. In 
that year, the party adopted a “social fascist” platform under the instruction of the 
Comintern and directed a substantial amount of propaganda at the Social Democrats. 
However, in the spring 1932, the party briefly abandoned attacks on the SPD. The 
Comintern responded by censuring the KPD for opposing their directive, and by June, the 
party had reverted back to the “social fascist” platform.7 
Heartfield and the IAH took a separate political path in these same months. The 
AIZ montages abandoned the vilification of Social Democrats early in 1932 in accordance 
with the party’s direction, but they never returned to this theme for the remainder of the 
year. Throughout 1932, not a single one of Heartfield’s montages targeted the Social 
Democrats, whereas the year before, anti-SPD ridicule was the prevalent focus in his 
propaganda.  In fact, the AIZ printed a montage produced by Heartfield in July 1932 that 
went against the party line and proposed a united front coalition with Social Democrats. 
                                                
6 This distinct leftist mission brought ridicule from the KPD itself, but without Münzenberg, the 
propaganda channels open to the Communists would have been more limited. Helmut Gruber, “Willi 
Münzenberg’s German Communist Propaganda Empire, 1921-1933,” The Journal of Modern History 38, 
no. 3 (September 1966): 289, accessed February 11, 2014, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1877352.  
7 Eve Rosenhaft, Beating the Fascists? The German Communists and Political Violence, 1929-1933 (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 82; Sabine Kriebel, “Photomontage in the Year 1932: John 
Heartfield and the National Socialists,” Oxford Art Journal 31, no. 1 (January 2008): 116, accessed March 
03, 2014, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20108008.  
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This discrepancy between the KPD and Heartfield’s propaganda in the IAH challenges a 
standard narrative of the German Communist political system in the Weimar period.  
According to this historical account of the German Communist Party, the KPD’s 
allegiance to Moscow grew stronger over the course of the Weimar Republic, and by 
1932, top-down Comintern directives regulated KPD politics. For instance, Bruce Murray 
writes that the “KPD’s alliance with the Soviet Union and the Comintern intensified” in 
1926, when Ernst Thälmann took over the party leadership. Thälmann thought it required 
of the party to loyally follow the Comintern and allowed Moscow to tighten its control 
over the KPD.8 Eric D. Weitz constructs this same narrative in Creating German 
Communism. He acknowledges that there exists a notion of the Soviet Union as “the 
nefarious force” controlling the KPD in too “many historical accounts” but states that 
Moscow still cemented its top-down control by the end of the 1920s. By that point, party 
members knew that to oppose Stalin and the Comintern meant political death.9 It is 
possible that Ben Fowkes’ book Communism in Germany is one of these “historical 
accounts” that Weitz refers to; Fowkes claims that the KPD’s adherence to Moscow’s 
orders only deepened as the interwar period progressed. Like Murray, he focuses on the 
vital role that Thälmann and his loyalty to the KPD played in this development.10  
The AIZ’s visual propaganda in this last year of Weimar Republic challenges this 
account of the German Communists growing devotion to Soviet Russia. From 1930 until 
the summer of 1932, members of the KPD opposed the Comintern’s instruction, which 
on its own tests the narrative of strict Comintern control. In any case, by July of 1932, the 
                                                
8 Murray, Cagliari, 109.  
9 Eric D. Weitz, Creating German Communism, 1890-1990: From Popular Protests to Socialist State 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 235.  
10 Ben Fowkes, Communism in Germany under the Weimar Republic (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1984), 192-7.  
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KPD was cooperating with Moscow’s direction. At the same moment, Heartfield’s 
photomontage for the magazine indicated a real subversion of the approved party line. 
Moreover, the visual was appearing in an illustrated newspaper with a mass base 
audience that far exceeded that of the party organ, Die Rote Fahne. With such an 
expansive readership, Heartfield’s oppositional propaganda in 1932 could have spread to 
a significantly large population. 
This paper contends that the montages Heartfield produced as IAH propaganda 
are a window into a much more bottom-up, rather than top-down, story of what was 
happening among German Communists from 1929 to Hitler’s chancellorship; These 
visual sources demonstrate that there were contested moments during these pre-Nazi 
years, in which those involved in the creation of this visual propaganda undermined the 
Communist Party line. These findings could suggest that in this instance, an artist who 
came from a background in the modernist avant-garde influenced shifts in the political 
environment and contributed to a moment of openness and dispute among German 
Communists.  
This research also makes a new contribution to the literature on Heartfield. With 
the exception of a few studies, art historians have written most historical works on 
Heartfield.11 These authors have successfully created an engaging discourse on the artist, 
                                                
11 In the last two years, Andrés Mario Zervigón and Sabine Kriebel published books on the political nature 
of Heartfield’s work. Zervigón argues that Heartfield’s success in turning the Communist photomontage 
into a mass medium came from his experiences with his early Dadaist art in Berlin. Heartfield distrusted 
the solitary photograph and wanted to reveal the “truth” that it disguised. Kriebel makes a similar argument 
but maps Heartfield’s transformation over the course of the interwar years in Germany. She posits that the 
photomontage was a highly relevant visual medium in the Weimar Republic, and it was integral to the 
political culture of the period. For her, Heartfield was essential to this bourgeoning medium. Maud Lavin 
and Beth-Irwin Lewis are two other art historians who have also done work on Heartfield. Lavin included a 
discussion of Heartfield in her book Clean New World: Culture, Politics, and Graphic Design as a 
historical example of how graphic designers can be influential cultural actors. Lewis discusses Heartfield 
alongside his brother, Wieland Herzfelde, and George Grosz. According to her, Heartfield created a 
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and for that reason, this paper will draw on much of their research and conclusions. 
However, taken together, they overlook the significance of the Heartfield photomontages 
in regards to the political relationships between the Communist Party and its associated 
cultural organizations. Some of this scholarship on Heartfield recognizes 1932 as a 
pivotal year, but these authors focus on the artist’s antifascist propaganda.12 The 
appearance of anti-SPD work, and its subsequent disappearance in 1932 is much less 
prominent in the analyses. Accordingly, this paper will combine an examination of both 
anti-SPD propaganda and antifascist propaganda with a discussion of the KPD’s political 
situation to illustrate how Heartfield and the AIZ disrupted the acceptance of party 
doctrine in these pre-Nazi years.  
This study is foremost a political history of an art medium, rather than the 
standard art history of a political artist. Despite their dominant focus on schools of art, 
several historians still manage to consider the political side of the Communist artist’s 
work. I am readjusting their standard interpretation by melding an analysis of the 
montages with the historical context of the Heartfield-Münzenberg alliance in the AIZ, 
along with KPD politics, in order to expose a specific instance when the propaganda that 
came out of modernist art form refused to conform to the party line and contributed to a 
contested political environment.  
This analysis will begin with background on Heartfield and the chronology of his 
career over the course of the Weimar period. This section introduces the central character 
                                                                                                                                            
“uniquely transparent didactic form” in the photomontage, and almost any experience in his career as a 
Weimar artist was a part of this formation. Andrés Mario Zervigón, John Heartfield and the Agitated 
Image: Photography, Persuasion, and the Rise of Avant-Garde Photomontage (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2012); Sabine Kriebel, Revolutionary Beauty: The Radical Photomontages of John 
Heartfield (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2013); Maud Lavin, Clean New World: Culture, 
Politics, and Graphic Design (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2001); Lewis, “Critic,” 37. 
12 Kriebel, “Year 1932.” 
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of the study in greater depth and describes his artistic and political development over the 
Weimar period that transformed him into the radical artist he would remain while 
working for the AIZ. This background will construct a trajectory leading up to 
Heartfield’s IAH service, which began in 1929. His photomontages, which were a result 
of years of experimentation with his aesthetic as an artist in Berlin, then spread with the 
IAH’s propaganda and the increasing readership of the AIZ. Heartfield’s work reached an 
audience he would probably never have found on his own.  
After this background, the paper will move into a substantial discussion on 
official sources of KPD propaganda between 1930 and 1931 in order to provide a 
comparative framework for Heartfield’s photomontages in these same years. After 
surveying the KPD’s official propaganda, this section introduces examples of IAH 
propaganda, such as written documents pertaining to the photomontage form and the AIZ 
photomontages, in order to establish the differences between formal party propaganda 
and the tradition of the photomontage. Moreover, these sources demonstrate that 
Heartfield’s unique aesthetic and a broad political readership made the AIZ photomontage 
a more effective form of propaganda than these KPD counterparts.   
Following this consideration, the paper will move into a brief discussion on the 
relevant political relationships between the KPD, IAH, and the Comintern, and how they 
led to the contested moment in 1932. The relationship between the IAH and the KPD was 
tested in 1932 as the KPD continued to have its own contentions with the Comintern. 
This section establishes a political context for Heartfield’s oppositional propaganda in the 
summer of 1932.  
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Finally, the paper will close with a consideration of his photomontages from July 
1932 until February 1933. Heartfield’s photomontages in this span of time get at the crux 
of this paper’s argument. The photomontages provide the historian with a window into 
the political contentions between German Communists in this year. Against the political 
background, the visual propaganda illustrates that there was a significant break in July 
1932. For the most part, Heartfield’s photomontages since he started at the AIZ 
corresponded to KPD policy, but in 1932, his work diverged from the KPD line.  
This analysis of the politicized visuals also compares other shifts in Berlin’s 
political landscape to the content of the photomontages. For example, as antifascist 
visuals became the most regular feature of Heartfield’s photomontages in 1932, the Nazis 
were making substantial gains in their voter numbers. All of these images were part of a 
longstanding effort to undermine the voter leverage that the Nazis had. This antifascist 
material was complicated by the debate among Communists over the official stance on 
Germany’s Social Democrats. By considering the political situation in this year and the 
imagery of the montages side by side, the historian can further understand the 
motivations behind the propaganda and how these concerns conflicted with party policy. 
Before getting to his montage creations, a context for Heartfield’s life and work in 
the Weimar Republic is warranted. John Heartfield was actually born Helmut Herzfelde, 
but later Anglicized his name as a protest to World War I. He started producing art for 
Malik Verlag, a publishing house, in 1916. Malik Verlag began as an antiwar conduit for 
Heartfield, Herzfelde, and George Grosz, a talented painter and close friend of Heartfield 
for most of the 1920s.13 The three men started a short-lived antiwar periodical called 
Neue Jugend. The periodical was banned several times by the Reichstag government, but 
                                                
13 Lavin, Clean, 14.  
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Malik Verlag was able to run it in some form for most of the war by changing the print 
schedule and the name. Heartfield was responsible for managing the paper’s 
typography.14 In this position, he experimented with presenting words and images in an 
appealing arrangement and used that experience to form the layout and composition 
techniques for his photomontage artwork that would come later.  
Heartfield’s relationship with Grosz also shaped his with art and propaganda 
during and shortly after the war. The two men became close after meeting in Berlin in 
1915, and together, they invented a crude form of antiwar agitprop.15 As Heartfield and 
Grosz saw it, film and photography had degenerated into archaic and useless mediums, 
because the government censored war publicity. Their response to this was to send 
disconcerting postcards to German soldiers at the front; they used images, and an early 
form of the montage method in order to expose the true horrors of war, upset the 
recipients, and spread discontent.16 Grosz would sketch drawings for the cards, and 
Heartfield would arrange the layout. The postcards were the first of much collaboration 
between these two Dadaists. More importantly, the postcards were another step in the 
evolving form of Heartfield photomontage.17 He learned how to convey a satirical 
message against the war effort using the visual devices of this propaganda. Even before 
he joined an official party, Heartfield was a politically motivated individual who had 
begun to devise an avant-garde photomontage form.  
Heartfield, Herzfelde, and Grosz all became members of the German Communist 
Party almost immediately after its foundation in 1918. Malik Verlag eventually became 
                                                
14 Beth Irwin Lewis, George Grosz: Art and Politics in the Weimar Republic (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1971), 45.  
15 Lewis, Grosz, 41.  
16 Zervigón, Agitated, 42.  
17 These postcards are “known to us today only through descriptions.” Zervigón, Agitated, 41.  
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closely associated with the party as an essentially outsourced publishing house, but it 
never became an official branch.18 Nevertheless, Heartfield experimented with party 
artwork while working there. For instance, he designed book jacket covers for 
Communist authors, such as Grosz or Kurt Tucholsky. Many of these covers again relied 
on the photomontage method that would make Heartfield famous in the late 1920s and 
early 1930s.19 From postcards to book covers, his early experiments with the montage 
method allowed him to engage with an aesthetic form that had vast political potential.  
The photomontage’s political value in the Communist movement thrilled 
Heartfield. He saw no use in art that did not have a political role. He was deeply troubled 
by the artists’ status in a capitalist society. This anxiety is a facet of the artist’s life that 
Lewis addresses in her essay, “Grosz/Heartfield: The Artist as a Social Critic.” Her words 
are worth quoting in length: “For both men, the veneration of art and culture was a 
bourgeois swindle designed to keep the masses docile, to dampen revolutionary ardor, 
and to undermine the class consciousness of the proletariat.”20 Here, Lewis is identifying 
a belief that drove Heartfield and Grosz to create sarcastic art that opposed mainstream 
culture. Heartfield would express this viewpoint many times over the remainder of his 
career. Not only did bourgeois art disguise the harsh realities of the world, it hindered the 
class revolution, which Heartfield considered himself a part of. His solution was an 
original proletariat culture that rejected all bourgeois counterparts.  
He wanted the working class to harness art as a weapon against bourgeoise 
culture and society. This desire compelled him to join the Red Group or Union of 
Communist Artists in Germany in 1924. The Red Group was an artistic association, and 
                                                
18 Lavin, Clean, 14.  
19 Lavin, Clean, 14.  
20 Lewis, “Critic,” 27.  
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its mission statement mandated that the members act as a Communist first and as “special 
or skilled worker” second.21 These artists pledged that all their ability and talent was to 
serve a single function: the advancement of the communist struggle.  
Heartfield’s contribution to this movement would be to reshape the medium of 
photography and create a new modernist aesthetic that he could use to reach and inspire 
the masses. He distrusted the message of traditional art forms, the photograph included. 
The failure of the solitary photograph was part of what drew him to the photomontage 
medium in the first place. He wanted images to portray a raw reality, and for them to do 
this, he would have to devise a new visual medium that was political and belligerent.22 
Heartfield used images he took from the illustrated press to achieve this end. Many of 
these pictures had already appeared to the public and thus, his manipulation of them 
could have a greater satirical effect. Nonetheless, he still feared that the photomontage 
would work to deceive the public rather than inform it as the bourgeois photograph had 
done before.23  
He was consequently troubled by an uncertainty about his own medium’s value. 
Andrés Mario Zervigón already considers this anxiety in John Heartfield and the 
Agitated Image. Therefore, it is not the goal of this discussion to reflect on it at length. 
Nonetheless, it is evidence of the effects of Communist politics on his artistic maturation.  
Communist ideology taught Heartfield to remain skeptical of all bourgeois art. This 
skepticism evoked a relentless fear in Heartfield over his own work, because he was 
aware that the photomontage had to rely on the mechanics of photography when targeting 
the leftist masses. 
                                                
21 Lewis, Grosz, 115.  
22 Zervigón, Agitated, 6-7.  
23 Zervigón, Agitated, 6.  
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Münzenberg, who had similar political inclinations, created a propaganda network 
that would ultimately allow Heartfield to reach this audience with his art and become an 
influential propagandist himself.  Münzenberg was a KPD member, and his Communist 
propaganda network spread to multiple European countries.24 The German IAH was 
perhaps the largest organization he built in his lifetime. It was a vast network for 
Communist propaganda, which had no equal in the years from 1929 until 1931.25 The 
IAH consisted of a film production company, two tabloids, literary magazines, and most 
importantly for the purposes of this paper, two periodicals, the AIZ and Der Arbeiter-
Fotograf (The Worker Photographer). Münzenberg started printing these two periodicals 
between 1924 and 1926.26  
Münzenberg was also the man responsible for hiring Heartfield to work for the 
AIZ. The two men’s partnership was no coincidence. Münzenberg was surely aware of 
Heartfield’s work, especially by the mid-1920s when Malik Verlag began operating as 
essentially an outsourced publishing house for the KPD. In addition, Heartfield and 
Münzenberg had an ideological likeness. They were both convinced that the leftist artist 
had a revolutionary role to uphold in the creation of political propaganda.  
Heartfield started working for the magazine in 1929; by the next year, it had 
experienced a noticeable spike in its readership.27 Determining exactly how the AIZ 
achieved such a circulation is problematic. The respective popularity was highly 
                                                
24 Cristina Cuevas-Wolf, “Montage as Weapon: The Tactical Alliance between Willi Münzenberg and John 
Heartfield,” New German Critique 36, no. 2 (Summer 2009): 186, accessed February 11, 2014, 
http://ngc.dukejournals.org/content/36/2_107/185.full.pdf+html. 
25 Bernhard Fulda, Press and Politics in the Weimar Republic (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 
24.  
26 Cuevas-Wolf, “Montage,” 185. 
27 The AIZ’s readership was 350,000 by 1930, an increase of approximately 100,000 from its 1927 figure. 
Eric D. Weitz, Weimar Germany: Promise and Tragedy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 
211.  
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dependent on consumer habits. All the same, there is ample reason to believe that 
Heartfield and his montages played a large part in the soaring popularity of the magazine.  
Heartfield’s experiences in the first ten years of the interwar period shaped his 
photomontage aesthetic and his particular politics, but the cultural dissemination of his 
work was limited to leftist art circles in Berlin. By working for the AIZ, he could satisfy 
his urge to deliver his new montage form to a mass base audience. That audience only 
grew as he spent more time at the magazine, and the photomontage went from a radical 
form of the avant-garde in Berlin to a familiar propaganda medium.  
The KPD’s official sources of propaganda were declining in popularity in the 
same years that the photomontage was on the rise. The secondary literature on the KPD 
has considered this dilemma.28 A common narrative that has emerged from the 
scholarship is that the Nazis had a relatively greater ability to appeal to wider audiences 
with their propaganda. In his study of political violence, Dirk Schumann claims the 
NSDAP was “modern in its propaganda techniques and in its status as a ‘people’s party’ 
                                                
28 According to historian Dirk Schumann, the streets became a setting for political performances in the 
wake of World War I, and Nazis and communists transformed this into violent struggles for urban terrain. 
He argues that the Nazi storm troopers and the less-organized Rotfrontkämpferbund (Red Front Fighter’s 
League or RFB) adopted a precedent of violent political action that was set by middle-class organizations 
like the Stahlhelm in the middle years in the Weimar period. Eve Rosenhaft’s Beating the Fascists? The 
German Communists and Political Violence, 1929-1933 also focuses on political violence, but it brings to 
light a significant contradiction in the history of the KPD’s Weimar years: there was rarely a consensus 
between party leaders and the KPD rank-and-file. She uses print journalism to make the argument that 
party rhetoric did not match reality in the apparatus of Weimar communism. Bernhard Fulda’s Press and 
Politics in the Weimar Republic proposes that Berlin readers did not necessarily read the newspapers of 
their political parties through its comprehensive comparison of electoral and circulation statistics. More 
important, however, is Fulda’s analysis of the KPD’s official press sources. He documents the decline in 
popularity of the party organ, Die Rote Fahne. Timothy Brown compares Nazi and Communist 
organizations to contend that both parties fought for a certain symbolic authority through their nationalist 
and socialist rhetoric. This symoblic struggle involved a political performance that he breaks down into 
subcategorical elements, the most important of which was a test of authenticity. Much of his comparison 
pertains to party propaganda. Hence, hix work is useful in this discussion. Dirk Schumann, Political 
Violence in the Weimar Republic, 1918-1933: Battles for the Streets and Fears of Civil War (New York: 
Berghahn Books, 2009); Rosenhaft, Fascists?; Fulda, Press; Timothy S. Brown, Weimar Radicals: Nazis 
and Communists between Authenticity and Performance (New York: Berghahn Books, 2009).  
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that was aimed, in principle, at all social strata.”29 The Nazis maintained the image they 
were a classless party.  In contrast, the KPD misjudged its rank and file of German 
workers, the party’s most crucial class of voters, a point that Eve Rosenhaft makes in her 
study on political violence in Weimar Berlin. According to her, writings in Die Rote 
Fahne, the party organ, were reflective of a lack of consensus between the Central 
Committee of the party and the rank and file.30 Not even KPD members were inclined to 
read the party’s newspaper. Bernhard Fulda confirms that there was a lack of interest in 
the political press among Communist members in Press and Politics in the Weimar 
Republic.31  
Timothy S. Brown agrees with this explanation for the discrepancy between Nazi 
and Communist propaganda. “All aspects of Nazi propaganda,” he argues, “were used 
because they had a wide appeal, a fact confirmed by many observers across the political 
spectrum.”32 This “wide appeal” allowed Nazi propaganda to serve its proper function, 
that of persuading numerous Germans to support their right-wing party. The 
Communists, however, did not witness this same degree of success because they held on 
to their party organs despite their waning popularity over the course of the Weimar 
period.  
A newspaper survey in 1924 taken by the party’s central newspaper, Die Rote 
Fahne, demonstrates how the popularity of the KPD’s political press was fading well 
before the IAH’s illustrated press took off. The Communists, concerned about their 
circulation figures in the competitive environment of the Berlin press market, published a 
                                                
29 Schumann, Violence, 213.  
30 Rosenhaft, Fascists?, 65-6. 
31 Fulda, Press, 26.  
32 Brown, Radicals, 53 
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report titled “What do workers think about Rote Fahne?”33 They received around sixty 
answers from a variety of people ranging from readers within the party to non-
communists who did not read the paper at all. Most of the responses were unflattering. 
One respondent answered that the “style” was not meant for the working class, its 
primary target audience. Rather, it was “more a paper for party functionaries than for the 
masses.”34 The respondents disagreed on the exact reasons why they preferred other 
papers or simply did not read political newspapers at all, but most saw Die Rote Fahne as 
uninteresting or beyond their political comprehension.35  
Seven years later, Die Rote Fahne’s situation had only worsened as they dropped 
from a circulation of over 30,000 to 23,000 in 1931. In addition to the declining 
popularity of the Die Rote Fahne, the KPD was struggling to match the right wing’s 
success in the polls with its election propaganda. Between 1928 and 1930, the NSDAP 
(Nazis) improved its voter percentage from 2.6 percent to 18.2 percent and surpassed the 
KPD, which saw only a 2.5 increase in voter percentage from 10.6 to 13.1.36 
At the same time, Münzenberg and Heartfield were making names for themselves 
in their illustrated press ventures. The IAH’s two photography periodicals managed to 
dwarf lesser Communist newspapers in their circulation numbers throughout this 
period.37 The success of the AIZ tests Brown’s comparison of Nazi and Communist 
propaganda, because the magazine had a wide appeal.  
                                                
33 Fulda, Press, 26. 
34 Fulda, Press, 26.  
35 Fulda, Press, 26-7.  
36 “Elections in the Weimar Republic,” Administration of the German Bundestag, March 2006, accessed 
March 1, 2014, 
http://www.bundestag.de/blob/189774/7c6dd629f4afff7bf4f962a45c110b5f/elections_weimar_republic-
data.pdf.  
37 Fulda, Press, 24.  
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As an illustrated weekly, the AIZ competed with not only newspapers but also 
visual propaganda, such as political posters. Hence, the political posters are another 
visual medium to consider here. The differences in formulaic qualities combined with the 
readership and production in the IAH allowed Heartfield’s photomontages to achieve a 
wider cultural spread. It could be argued, therefore, that the photomontages in the AIZ 
were more effective propaganda.  
A political poster from 1929 serves as a useful starting point. The poster 
contained an image of a skull with an SA helmet on it and a tattered Prussian imperial 
flag in the background. The prominent text read, “Faschismus der Todfeind der 
Arbeiter!” (Fascism, the deadly enemy of the worker!), and “Faschismus” was drawn as 
if it was dripping with blood (Figure 2).38 This cartoon signified anticommunist violence 
on the part of the Nazis, implying they were both a political and physical threat.39 The 
violent illustrations represented an imminent threat of an anticommunist war, a common 
idea among German Communists. Many German Communists, including Münzenberg, 
expressed a fear over an impending war against the Soviet Union.40 This poster referred 
to that notion by suggesting that the Nazis would instigate that sort of militarism.  
Just as important than the message of the poster, however, was its visual 
composition. The poster was a rudimentary hand-drawn cartoon with a limited amount of 
detail. For example, it appeared as if someone with the most basic drawing skills 
sketched the birds flying in the top left corner of the poster. Additionally, the cartoon was 
                                                
38 Figure 2. KPD, “Faschismus der Todfeind der Arbeiter!” (poster), Bundesarchiv, 1929, accessed 
February 10, 2014, 
http://www.bild.bundesarchiv.de/archives/barchpic/search/_1394219365/?search[view]=detail&search[focu
s]=19. 
39 Ironically, combative paramilitary groups could have taken this as approval of their skirmishes on the 
streets of Berlin, although the KPD officially discouraged this type of “individual terror.” Rosenhaft, 
Fascists?, 58.  
40 Gruber, “Empire,” 295.  
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essentially a single drawing with a consistent color scheme. Unlike the photomontage 
that took fragments from a variety of different sources, this cartoon was an original 
drawing done from scratch to make a simple political statement. Heartfield too worked 
towards clear political messages with his montages for the AIZ, but he wanted his 
viewership to be actively engaged with the propaganda. To achieve this end, he stole 
recognizable images from the popular press. Beth Irwin-Lewis calls this his “uniquely 
transparent didactic form.”41 With a little bit of time, the informed reader could gather 
Heartfield’s purpose in compiling images in such a distinct manner. In comparison, the 
educated individual could not miss the immediate meaning of a political poster with such 
explicit text and artless cartoons.  
 
Figure 2. “Faschismus der Todfeind der Arbeiter!,”1929. 
The next example also contained illustrations referring to the threat of an 
imperialist war against the Soviet Union. The illustrator drew an outstretched arm 
                                                
41 Lewis, “Critic,” 37.  
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grabbing a rifle with a red flag tied around the barrel (Figure 3).42 The poster was an 
antiwar plea for Germany Communists to protest the imperialist war or “krieg dem 
imperialistischen Kriege” (fight the imperialist war).  Although this poster was not 
explicitly antifascist, Communists regularly claimed that the Nazis were behind an 
imperialist war against the Soviet Union. 
 
Figure 3. “Krieg dem imperialistischen Kriege!,” 1931.  
The illustrations in this antiwar poster are even simpler than the previous 
example. The arm and gun were only sketches, and black and red were the only two 
colors in the poster. The arm could have, in theory, belonged to anyone, which was a tool 
the KPD could have used to portray its working-class base. In contrast, Heartfield did not 
need to use this kind of technique in his photomontages. He had a plethora of images 
                                                
42 Figure 3. KPD, “Krieg dem imperialistischen Kriege!” (poster), Bundesarchiv, 1931, accessed February 
10, 2014, 
http://www.bild.bundesarchiv.de/archives/barchpic/search/_1408042178/?search[view]=detail&search[focu
s]=44.  
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from Berlin’s mainstream press at his disposal. Instead of using universal images of the 
common worker, he could draw on a diverse range of sources and select recognizable 
photographs to cut into fragments for a photomontage. As a result, his montage form was 
a more intimate and deeply perceptive form of propaganda.  
Another poster from 1930 focused on a similar antifascist theme as the first 
example. Once again, a Nazi soldier with an SA helmet was depicted as a menacing skull. 
The whole left side containing the SA soldier was black and ominous, which contrasted 
with the right side of the poster showing a Communist family enjoying life outside their 
modest house. The three words jutting across this dichotomous illustration read “Tod 
oder Brot” (Death or bread) (Figure 4).43 Similar to the previous poster, this cartoon 
denounced the Nazi Party for its violent predilections.  
 
Figure 4. “Tod oder Brot,” 1930.  
 
This second poster contained a comparable set of visual qualities. It was also 
hand-drawn, and each side had a fixed color scheme. Although this poster looked like it 
required more time and effort than the previous example, the person who drew it was 
                                                
43 Figure 4. KPD, “Tod oder Brot” (poster), Hoover Institution Political Database, 1930, accessed February 
9, 2014, http://hoohila.stanford.edu/poster/view_subject.php?posterID=GE+828.  
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probably an illustrator, not an artist with the extensive background of Heartfield. The 
cartoons on the right side of the poster were also noteworthy, because they were generic 
figures of a Communist family. Nothing was significant about them other than their 
typical working-class appearance. Although the cartoons juxtaposed illustrations as one 
can see in the poster below, they were mere caricatures. The figures that would appear in 
a Heartfield photomontage were most often familiar faces taken from their original 
sources in the popular press and would. Communist Heinz Lüdecke noted this distinction 
in 1931 when he wrote, “Instead, we see something printed ‘in the original.’ The pictures, 
therefore – this is obvious – are more than ‘illustrations.’”44 Here, Lüdecke referred to 
how actual photographs could serve as “pictorial” examples of a certain text, rather than 
only illustrate that text as drawings would. Heartfield’s photomontages added another 
element to this. The images were recycled to construct a new political message, but if the 
viewer recognized that the pictures were taken from another source, as many probably 
did, they had an additional political undertone. Therefore, they could evoke a more acute 
reaction. 
Unlike the photomontage, these political posters did not have a history of artistic 
tradition or a set of aesthetic principles taken from an avant-garde movement. 
Heartfield’s works in the AIZ had a tradition dating back to the post-World War I 
experiments in Dadaist Berlin. A variation on the aesthetic from that art movement 
characterized the photomontages that later appeared in the AIZ.  There is a slight irony in 
this comparison. Although it was more time-consuming, Heartfield could assemble a 
photomontage like a cartoonist could draw a political poster.  He could create an entirely 
                                                
44 Heinz Lüdecke, “Bild-Wort-Montage: Ein Vorschlag zur Zusammenarbeit von Fotografen und 
Schriftstellern,” Der Arbeiter-Fotograf 9 (September 1931), in Worker Photography, 114.  
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new image almost from scratch. And yet, by including clippings and images that an 
average Berliner would recognize, Heartfield’s montages had a political relevance that 
posters did not.  
The photomontage and the political poster also diverged in their consumption and 
production. Political posters were usually created and distributed by the Communist Party 
itself, frequently during months leading up to party elections. One could find them hung 
as a banner on a building, in a kiosk window, or attached to a light post. In contrast, 
photomontages were circulated by the IAH through the AIZ. They did not necessarily 
correspond with a political milestone but still echoed the political realities. Heartfield’s 
photomontages were placed on many covers of the AIZ and inside of it for special topic 
issues.45  
The photomontage technique that Heartfield first experimented with as an artist 
working for Malik Verlag in Berlin had become a creative medium that the German 
Communist movement desperately needed to reinvigorate its party propaganda. Although 
this new form eventually came under the control of the IAH, an associated but ultimately 
independent Communist organization, the photomontage was a much-needed boost to 
Communist propaganda.   
Just as these montage creations appeared with more regularity in 1930 and 1931, 
Communists began to write for the IAH about photography experimentation and its vast 
potential as propaganda. Der Arbeiter-Fotograf, the IAH periodical, serves as an 
excellent written record of Communist theorizing in this section. Münzenberg founded 
Der Arbeiter-Fotograf for the purpose of teaching German workers how to harness the 
photograph and all it entailed as an effective tool for the communist class struggle. Its 
                                                
45 Heartfield, Heartfield, 14.  
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writers thought of photography as an ideal rallying tool, and they underlined many of its 
practical advantages with their contributions. These writers believed that experimentation 
in new photographic technique could help the IAH galvanize the leftist masses that 
consumed their propaganda.  
Münzenberg himself authored several pieces for Der Arbeiter-Fotograf, which 
allows the historian to account for his notions about his propaganda efforts. An essay 
written by Münzenberg in 1927 is an effective starting point for this part of the discussion 
because it predicted the later success of his project. In it he envisioned an organization 
called “Die Internationale der Arbeiter-fotografen” (The Worker Photographers’ 
International). Münzenberg was one of the first to grasp the immense potential behind 
photographic propaganda.46 The photography that would result from education in his 
organization would be “practical” propaganda, rather than art. It would serve an 
unequivocal purpose in the class revolution that he and his fellow Communists sought to 
inspire. Münzenberg realized the social and political implications of Communist 
photography, and the content of his magazine reflected this awareness. He believed there 
were far more benefits to an illustrated journal than a political daily, saying, 
“Photographs convey impressions and genuine experiences to a much greater degree than 
does the written word.”47 The literate public in Berlin appeared to agree with this, 
because in the late 1920s just as the circulation of the AIZ took off, the circulation of 
newspapers, like Die Rote Fahne, continued to shrink.48  
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Other Communist authors joined Münzenberg in this consideration of 
photography’s role in Communist propaganda. Hermann Leupold was one of these 
writers. He argued that those bourgeoisie people with leftist leanings were part of the 
audience that could be stimulated by worker photography. At the beginning of one of his 
essays, Leupold castigated the bourgeoisie in standard communist fashion but then 
admitted that middle-class photographers could still be politically turned. “New recruits 
can be won for the class struggle; it is necessary to organize them.”49 According to 
Leupold, bourgeois photography could never capture the essence of the class struggle. He 
went as far as making the generalizing accusation that it was based on forgery and 
outright lies.50  Photographic propaganda was a task reserved for the Communist 
individual, but that did not mean that the bourgeoisie should be excluded from the IAH’s 
propaganda.  
Leupold wanted to separate working-class photography from that of the middle 
and upper classes. According to not only him, but also Heartfield, bourgeois photography 
was for superfluous enjoyment. Alternatively, the photography and photomontages of the 
proletariat had a vital political role. This theorizing about the differences between 
proletariat and bourgeois photography alluded to the larger readership of the IAH. These 
writers would not have been making these arguments in a photography journal if there 
were not a non-communist readership seeing their material. In fact, several of the people 
who contributed to the AIZ were not Communist members. Helmut Gruber posits that this 
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50 Leupold, “Waffe,” 117.  
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was intentional on Münzenberg’s part.51 He wanted to maintain the broad leftist image of 
the magazine.52  
The photomontage’s appearance in the AIZ starting in 1930 was an extension of 
this appeal to the wide audience that the magazine maintained. The IAH network would 
ensure that Heartfield’s photomontages reached thousands of readers from a number of 
parties, including the KPD and the SPD. As this portion of the paper demonstrates, the 
photomontage became a leading form of propaganda in the late 1920s and early 1930s 
due to not only its popularity as propaganda with a distinct aesthetic but also its 
connection to the IAH’s widespread leftist audience. To understand the photomontage as 
German Communists used it, a discussion of the appeal behind this visual medium as 
expressed by Communist writers is also warranted. The influential Communists behind 
this medium were committed to a campaign of mass dissemination, and it would come to 
rely on Heartfield’s photomontage, just as his photomontages would rely on the IAH’s 
network. Both written sources describing these efforts and the photomontages so crucial 
to them serve as an entry point into this propaganda crusade.  
In 1931, Münzenberg outlined the “Tasks and Objectives” that fueled visual 
propaganda, particularly in the AIZ. He discussed some of the advantages that the AIZ 
had as an illustrated publication, which were indeed a factor in its increase in circulation. 
He compared the illustrated magazine to dry political dailies, arguing that “an illustrated 
magazine is more entertaining than a leading article in a political daily.”53 By 1931, this 
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statement had already proven true as Die Rote Fahne’s circulation reached a new low of 
23,000 that year.54 
He claimed that the photomontage could impress on the politically naïve reader 
because of its interplay between photograph and text: “That is the decisive point. In this 
way, a skillful editor can reverse the significance of any photograph and influence a 
reader who lacks political sophistication in any direction he chooses.”55  
Take for example one of Heartfield’s first photomontages from 1930. It contained 
the image of Emile Vandervelde, a Belgian Social Democrat active in the early twentieth 
century, superimposed over press clippings in English, French and German. (Figure 5).56  
The message of this piece came out of the pairing of Vandervelde’s image with 
newspaper clippings. A standalone image of the politician would have lacked any 
significant meaning. Likewise, the collage of newspaper headlines would have had no 
clear connection without a large Vandervelde in the center of the frame. When Heartfield 
assembled the montage how it is shown above, a connection between violence and 
capitalist countries became apparent.  Vandervelde was known for his belief that there 
could be stable peace in a capitalist country.57 He was a member of the Second 
International, an international coalition of Social Democratic parties founded in 1889. 
Many of the politicians involved in this association, including Vandervelde, believed in 
an orderly capitalist society that, for example, could achieve labor reform without 
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revolutionary violence.58 The newspaper clippings suggested the opposite: that capitalist 
rule caused violence and repression. For example, one clipping started with the words 
“Blutige käm-” (Bloody fight-?), but Vandervelde’s right shoulder covered the remainder 
of the headline.59 Other headlines included “Polizei schiess-” (Police shoot-?) and “Rote 
Fahne beschlagnahmt” (Rote Fahne confiscated).60  
 
Figure 5. Vandervelde oder Die vollkommene Schamlosigkeit, 1930. 
 
This was the visual interplay that Münzenberg described. Heartfield, “the editor” 
had altered the “significance” of the photographs by arranging the montage in this 
particular way. Heartfield separated these images and headlines from mainstream media 
to derive a meaning that they would not have had in their original form. The layout of this 
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piece was striking, because it was this contrast between the clippings and image that 
created a logical overlap between Vandervelde and capitalist violence.  
This ultra-leftist stance was a regular feature of Heartfield’s work, especially 
throughout 1930 when “social fascism” became a common theory among German 
Communists, but his favorite target was the NSDAP. It is therefore necessary to consider 
an illustrative instance of his antifascism. In an AIZ issue from the same year as the last 
example, he produced a photomontage that depicted a relationship between the two 
Communist enemies of Nazis and capital.61 The photomontage portrayed Hitler as a shark 
in the mouth of a larger catfish representing capital (Figure 6).62 The catfish wore a top 
hat with a swastika on it. The top hat was a visual sign often used in Communist 
propaganda to symbolize big business capitalism. The text across the belly of the 
upturned fish and along the bottom of the frame made the association of Nazism with big 
business jump out at the reader if it did not already: “MIT GOTT FÜR HITLER UND 
KAPITAL. ‘Und den Fisch hab’ ich gewählt!’” (WITH GOD FOR HITLER AND 
CAPITAL. “And this is the fish I elected!”).63 In addition, this photomontage was a 
reference to the September Reichstag elections, in which the Nazis gained ninety-five 
seats, a significant jump when their previous number was only twelve. The images 
suggested that capitalist business was the driving force behind the political victory.  
The visual tools added significance to this piece. Heartfield used 
anthropomorphism as a satirical device here. Nazism was shown as a slimy fish, helpless 
in the mouth of a much larger animal, which had its own set of suggestions about the 
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party’s integrity and competency. Heartfield would use this anthropomorphic technique 
many times after this when using images of animals to portray anything from other 
Weimar figures to war or capitalism.  
 
 
 
Figure 6. 6 Millionen Naziwähler: Futter für ein groβes Maul, 1930. 
 
The words that accompanied the solitary image of the two fish made the 
connection between the fish, capitalism and Nazism overt.  In this way, this 
photomontage was exemplary of text’s value in Heartfield’s aesthetic. Text played a 
prominent role in every one of Heartfield’s photomontages in these later Weimar years. It 
allowed the viewer to more easily assess the meaning of a photomontage that contained 
Heartfield’s abstract devices, such as the anthropomorphism above or metaphors of scale. 
Yet, the text was not some sort of key to define the images outright but rather, a part of 
the artwork itself. The text and images were both vital to the aesthetic that could be found 
in Heartfield’s montages.  
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Lüdecke wrote an essay in 1931 that considered the pairing of text and 
photograph images. He demanded that writers and photographers collaborate for the 
purpose of propaganda. This article, written for Der Arbeiter-Fotograf, envisioned a 
medium that combined skilled writing with photography. In the essay title, “Bild-Wort-
Montage: Ein Vorschlag zur Zusammenarbeit von Fotografen und Schriftstellern” 
(Picture-Word-Montage: A Proposal for the Collaboration of Photographers and Writers), 
he alluded to what seems like the photomontage but avoided the usage of the actual 
term.64  
His “Bild-Wort-Montage” would simply be a new publishing format for a niche 
medium, which Heartfield and Münzenberg already excelled in. Lüdecke’s compound 
medium would transcend both the meaning of the photograph or the “red mass” book.65 
This theoretical significance alluded to a problem of the non-illustrated political press. 
Berlin workers were not necessarily seeking out dense political writing. They preferred 
the accessibility of the magazine or the illustrated journal to the political daily. Thus, the 
lengthy “Bild-Wort-Montage” that Lüdecke imagined might have been marginally 
popular, limited to intellectual circles within the Communist Party, while Münzenberg’s 
illustrated press would continue to do just fine.  
Lüdecke still managed to indirectly outline the photomontage’s practical 
functions by describing his imagined idea. He claimed that people with little reading skill 
could still understand montages. The propaganda’s meaning would be accessible due to 
the text positioned next to the image. As well, he acknowledged that the rapid pace of 
                                                
64 Lüdecke, “Bild-Wort-Montage,” 113-5.  
65 Otto Biha, “Der proletarische Massenroman” (The Proletarian Mass Novel), Die Rote Fahne, August 2, 
1930, in The Weimar Republic Sourcebook, ed. Anton Kaes, Martin Jay, and Edward Dimendberg (Berkley 
and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995), 239. 
 32 
modern life in Berlin left the worker little time to read. This understanding was an 
underlying factor of all press journalism, but it applied more concretely to the union of 
picture and text. The worker needed to efficiently gather information and the 
accompanying pictures would expedite the process. He could shuffle through the text and 
receive guiding cues from the pictures or he could also just spare a quick glance at the 
photos alone.66  
The text was even more important in Heartfield’s next montage from 1930. In this 
piece, Heartfield targeted both the Nazis and the Social Democrats with his criticisms. On 
the middle right side of the montage, there was a group of formally dressed Nazis 
marching with their flag held above their heads. The Social Democrats are shown on the 
other side, marching in the same manner as the Nazis (Figure 7).67 This photomontage 
was simpler in its lack of satirical devices, but the text on the bottom of the frame is 
worth quoting at length: 
“Socialization is on the march!” 
the “Social” Democrats placarded, - 
and at the same time decided: 
Socialists are to be shot down. 
 
Since then the reaction is on the march: 
and today how mockingly scream 
National “Socialists” 
(I cannot help laughing): “Germany awake!” 
 
In vain! – For you vile parties 
have overlooked a vital factor: 
The German worker will awake 
and make Socialism a reality!68 
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Figure 7. Noch is Deutschland nicht verloren!, 1930.  
 
The reader would have gathered the political message of the montage from these 
stanzas. Heartfield accused both parties of fraudulently attempting to pose as socialist 
organizations. By placing the word socialism in quotes every time it referred to the 
NSDAP or the SPD, he was arguing that these parties’ promises of social reform were 
baseless. The only times that socialism appeared free of quotes was when it was used to 
describe German Communists. The KPD was the only party that could “make Socialism a 
reality” while these other parties were merely constructing a false myth.69 The title Noch 
is Deutschland nicht verloren! (Germany is not yet lost!) warned the viewer of the 
consequences of joining these “vile parties” at the top of the frame.70 If Berliners 
continued to vote for the Nazis and Social Democrats or if they simply supported the 
Social Democratic government, the country would be “lost.” This title also highlighted 
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the redemptive role that the KPD would play in Germany’s recovery. The harsh sarcasm 
of this piece took shape once the text was added to the images of the marchers.   
 This photomontage leads to a discussion of the wide-ranging appeal of the IAH. 
The IAH competed with mainstream media, and Münzenberg wanted its propaganda to 
spread to all leftists in the working class, even those who only sympathized with 
Communists yet did not want to join an official party.71 The AIZ was run by the 
expansive IAH and therefore, directed at a significant non-communist readership. Kriebel 
notes, “The purpose of the AIZ was to propagate a communist point-of-view to non-Party 
members and the so-called homeless left.”72 It was these individuals that Heartfield 
wanted to reach with a montage such as this. They remained outside of the Communist 
fold but would still see his work in the AIZ. The hope was that they would consider 
joining the true party of the “German worker” after viewing this piece. Heartfield’s 
photomontages were the ideal form to serve this propaganda function. The satirical 
devices and pairing of text and imagery gave them a profound aggression and an 
appealing humor that the KPD’s official propaganda did not have. 
Münzenberg even admitted that Der Arbeiter-Fotograf and the AIZ catered to a 
leftist middle ground. Under Münzenberg’s direction, the AIZ had absorbed a readership 
that was not exclusively Communist but included Social Democrats and other leftist 
parties. In yet another one of his authored pieces, “Zeitschriften und Bild” (Magazines 
and Photography), he celebrated the rise of the IAH and the subsequent founding of the 
AIZ. As one would expect, he wrote that the AIZ started as a proletarian endeavor. 
Nonetheless, it eventually gained respect within the wider Berlin press. He wrote, “In 
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1925 it was taken on by the publishing house Neuer Deutscher Verlag and continued as 
AIZ, which has become one of the leading magazines not only in the workers’ press but 
also among bourgeois illustrated magazines worldwide.”73 Münzenberg knew that his 
tabloids and periodicals included a significant number of non-communist and even non-
political Berliners, and as one would expect, they were targeted through the propaganda 
and distribution methods of the AIZ.74 The magazine found its readership by “way of 
newsstands, local bookstores, and a posse of street sellers.”75 Readers who got their hands 
on the magazine this way were told to pass it on by any means they could.76 In this way, 
the AIZ spread to a continually growing readership of Berlin’s leftist parties.  
Münzenberg was aware of the party breakdown of his readership and intentionally 
played the line between the two. Therefore, he did not place strict restrictions on the 
artistic freedom of his writers and artists, particularly in the AIZ. As long as the theme of 
the political material was pro-communist, it had a chance of making it to print. 
Heartfield’s accusatory propaganda continued to appear in Münzenberg’s 
magazine until the summer of 1931 when he departed for a yearlong hiatus in the Soviet 
Union.77 One of his photomontages in the months before he left showed a human-like 
figure with the head of a snarling tiger. The tiger was wearing a suit, complete with a tie 
and a swastika pin (Figure 8).78 The accompanying text stated that the tiger was a symbol 
of capitalism, and that the Social Democrats did not want to “break out the teeth of the 
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tiger” but instead, wanted to replenish his “health and feed him.”79 Reading just these 
words, one could assume Heartfield was making the allegation that SPD was allying with 
the enemy of Communists and presumably socialists: capitalism in all of its forms. He 
then followed this text with an explicit accusation, saying, “Social Democracy does not 
want the breakdown of capitalism. Like a doctor, it wants to try to heal and improve it 
(Fritz Tarnow, chairman of the Woodworkers’ Federation).”80 This indictment did have 
an explainable basis. Fritz Tarnow, the man referred to in the text, was an SPD trade 
unionist who was notorious for his assimilationist views. He believed that unionists and 
workers should adapt to capitalism, since it appeared to be effectively working in 1931 
Germany.81 Heartfield used Tarnow as an emblematic example of the entire SPD. 
 
 
Figure 8. Zum Krisen-Parteitag der SPD, 1931. 
                                                
79 Heartfield, Heartfield, 68.   
80 Heartfield, Heartfield, 68. 
81 Heartfield, Heartfield, 68.  
 37 
In addition, this photomontage used hybridization, a graphic device not as 
prominent in the other montages. Hybridization or “the inmixing of binary opposites, 
particularly of high and low, such as that there is a heterodox merging of elements 
usually perceived as incompatible,” could be seen in the central image.82 Capitalism was 
depicted with a comical image: a snarling tiger’s head on top of a human body. This 
binary opposition was a creative device for a leftist artist with contempt for capitalist 
society. With these two cutouts, Heartfield implied that capitalism was man’s violent and 
unnatural creation.  
In 1932, Alfred Keményi reflected on the success of propaganda like this over the 
course of the last few years. He wrote an essay titled “Fotomontage als Waffe im 
Klassenkampf” (Photomontage as a Weapon in Class Struggle) in which he gave rather 
high praise to Heartfield for the work he had done for the Communist Party. Keményi 
tried to explain the popularity of the photomontage. First, he praised the satire of 
Heartfield’s work, saying his photomontages were “among the most significant satirical 
creations of our time.”83 As well, Keményi noted how the photomontage medium became 
popular in a crucial political period for German Communists, “Because not only did it 
[the photomontage] not oppose the revolutionary development of humanity, but it 
developed in close conjunction with the revolutionary workers’ movement.”84 The 
“revolutionary workers’ movement” could have been referring to a number of 
developments since the Russian Revolution, but perhaps the best indicator of its progress 
in Germany was as Keményi saw it, Heartfield’s decision to employ his artistic talent in 
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the class struggle. Keményi credited Heartfield with the resurgence of the photomontage, 
but this development could hardly be called recent.85 Heartfield had been working for the 
AIZ since 1929.  
Still, Keményi was correct in giving Heartfield exuberant praise for his efforts. 
Alongside Münzenberg, Heartfield had created mass demand for the medium, and 
therefore, the AIZ. By 1932, the year Keményi’s essay appeared, the AIZ had reached a 
circulation of 500,000 prints per week and was the second most popular illustrated 
magazine behind only the moderately left Berliner Illustrierte Zeitung.86 Heartfield had 
become an influential cultural leader in Germany’s Communist movement due to his new 
satirical form and aesthetic and his attachment to the AIZ. Therefore, his choice to go 
against the party line in the summer of 1932 was immediately controversial.87 
The conflict in 1932 was also due to the shifts in Communist policy in the late 
1920s. These changes led to political tension within Germany’s Communist Party. From 
1928 until 1932, there were multiple instances in which leading party members, including 
Willi Münzenberg, opposed Comintern policy.  
In 1928, the Comintern officially introduced the idea of “social fascism” during 
the Sixth Congress of the international organization.88 In July of the following year, the 
Comintern expounded on its theory:  
In countries where there are strong social-democratic parties, fascism assumes the particular form 
of social-fascism, which to an ever-increasing extent serves the bourgeoisie as an instrument for 
the paralyzing of the activity of the masses in the struggle against the regime of fascist 
dictatorship. By means of this monstrous system of political and economic oppression, the 
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bourgeoisie, aided and abetted by international social democracy, have been attempting to crush 
the proletariat for many years.89  
 
The description went on, but the Comintern made it clear that these conditions 
were apparent in Germany, and the KPD needed to concentrate all its efforts against the 
“terror of German social fascism.”90 “Social fascism” was then adopted by the KPD in 
May of the following year at their Twelfth Party Congress in a Berlin working-class 
neighborhood. Earlier in this month, the Berlin police force had shot and killed twenty-
five unarmed Communist demonstrators under the instruction of the SPD police chief 
Karl Zörgiebel. The shootings during the annual May Day celebrations only confirmed 
that the SPD was a “social fascist” party for the members of the Central Committee. 
Multiple KPD leaders began to assert "social fascism" as part of the German party line 
almost immediately after the KPD Congress. Although there remained slight contention 
in the Central Committee of the KPD over this course since the SPD held onto a large 
bulk of the proletarian masses, most Communist propaganda directed at the SPD became 
harsher following this turn in May of 1929.91  
However, this “social fascist” turn between 1928 and 1929 can hardly be seen as a 
sharp break in KPD theory and discourse. Rather, it was the official announcement 
endorsed by Moscow that led to significant changes in KPD policy and associated 
propaganda. In fact, as early as 1924, the notion of the SPD as the true fascist party 
surfaced in KPD circles. Ultra-left hostility toward the SPD became common after an 
attempt at an Einheitsfront (united front) with the Social Democrats from 1922 until 1924 
disastrously failed as Ruth Fischer, a strong proponent of the ultra-left course, took over 
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party leadership.92 This sentiment was only reinforced when another united front in 1927 
and 1928 resulted in a similar ending. This time the right-wing faction of the KPD that 
supported a united front with the SPD was removed from the Central Committee, clearing 
the way for Ernst Thälmann to pursue another ultra-left path as the party’s new leader.93 
The KPD would continue to support potential united fronts from below between rank-
and-file workers and trade unionists, but these years of failed attempts are important, 
because the united fronts were began as an official policy of alliance with SPD leaders.  
The Comintern witnessed opposition to the “social fascist” turn in the early 1930s 
from within the KPD. Certain leaders were swayed by the potential benefit of united 
fronts “from below” and went against the Comintern to voice their disapproval over the 
“social fascist” agenda. Thälmann gave a speech in the fall of 1930 that demanded that 
the KPD direct its fight against the Nazis rather than the SPD. Thälmann was known to 
be a staunch supporter of Comintern directives, so it came as a surprise that he resisted 
Moscow’s position. The Comintern quickly responded to his plea and reminded him that 
Social Democrats were the true fascist enemy.94  
A similar kind of contention occurred in the winter of December 1931 when a 
coalition of free-trade unionists, Social Democrats, and Communists formed. The 
Comintern responded by restating the terms of the November resolution from a month 
before, which included an anti-Social Democratic stance. The Comintern continued to 
resist KPD efforts for a united front well into 1932. Moscow reprimanded certain KPD 
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leaders for negotiating with the SPD in June and even worse, removed people from the 
party who opposed the “social fascist” platform.95  
Heinz Neumann was one of these people and he was both a KPD Central 
Committee member and a co-editor of Die Rote Fahne. He was a leading doctrinaire of 
the party and had initially reinforced the idea of “social fascism” through his newspaper. 
In May 1929, the month of the “social fascist” announcement in the KPD, it was Die Rote 
Fahne that exclaimed “Beat the Fascists wherever you find them,” suggesting that the 
SPD was as much fascist as the ring-wing NSDAP.96  His paper then made a similar 
claim in December 1930 when it printed the words “Fascist dictatorship is no longer 
merely a threat, it is already here.”97 In September 1931, however, Neumann became 
concerned about the possibility of a Nazi takeover and began to support united-front 
fighting against the NSDAP. He continued to support united-front initiatives in the next 
year and for that, was expelled from the party leadership.98 Thälmann, on the other hand, 
treaded lightly and opportunistically adjusted to the Comintern's directives.  
Rosenhaft ascertains that a true conflict existed within the KPD leadership 
throughout 1932. She lists a number of other KPD leaders that were disciplined over the 
course of the year, including Central Committee members Hermann Remmele and Leo 
Flieg, as well as Communist Youth leaders Alfred Hiller and Kurt Müller. Factions 
emerged in the KPD with Thälmann and the Comintern on one side and Neumann and 
Remmele on the other. 
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Münzenberg was an active propagandist for the party during these moments of 
political conflict, but at points, it seemed as if he too was risking his credibility as a loyal 
Communist member. In 1924, he joined the ultra-left faction that arose in the party after 
the first united front failed.99 For the next half decade, he supported Moscow in all its 
directives and praised the cultural activity coming out of the country.100 However, in 
1930, he contemplated the possibility of an antifascist united front after the Nazi’s 
electoral success. Then a year later, Münzenberg and Neumann spoke out against 
Thälmann and the Comintern in an attempt to sidetrack anti-SPD propaganda for the sake 
of building a campaign against the Nazis.101 Münzenberg’s influential status within the 
Communist Party did not allow him to escape criticism from its leaders.102 Despite the 
IAH’s designs to spread communist ideas, the KPD occasionally treated his organization 
as an uncontrollable nuisance. 
 A subtle resistance to the party line could also be found in Heartfield’s 
photomontages that were printed in the AIZ in 1930. Rosa Leviné-Meyer, a Communist 
Party member and wife of Ernst Meyer of the KPD’s Central Committee, remembered in 
her memoirs that after the Party Congress in 1929, “Our entire propaganda concentrated 
on war scare and vilification of the ‘social fascists.’”103 Leviné-Meyer must not have 
been considering Heartfield and the AIZ when she made that statement, because the Nazis 
and the Social Democrats were both regular targets of the artist’s photomontages. 
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Heartfield even produced several montages in 1930 that suggested the Nazi Party was a 
more threatening enemy than the SPD. The separate sphere of the IAH can explain this 
mixture of both anti-SPD and antifascist propaganda. Targeting the Nazis and Social 
Democrats was a chosen tactic of Heartfield’s propaganda, because many of those in the 
AIZ’s broad readership could have easily turned to these parties. The Nazis and Social 
Democrats were both trying to capture the same group of voters. Heartfield chose to 
compete with them to affect these readers rather than demonstrate that he was 
consistently adhering to the party line.  
Heartfield made a similar decision in July of 1932 when he created his united 
front election montage. Thälmann announced on April 25, 1932 that a political agreement 
between Communists and Social Democrats was a definite possibility. However, both 
parties were hesitant to move forward with a rapprochement. According to historian 
Heinrich Winkler, the party had returned to a “social fascist” stance by July 14 after 
being instructed to by the Comintern.104 Heartfield’s poster appeared in the AIZ ten days 
later. The photomontage proposed a united front between the SPD and the KPD. The only 
text read “Die Rote Einheit macht euch frei! WÄHLT LISTE 3” (Red Unity Liberates 
You! VOTE LIST 3) (Figure 9).105  Another round of Reichstag elections were taking 
place on July 31, and the viewers were urged to vote Communist with “List 3.” The 
frame contained three arms all grabbing a flag with the symbol for the united front, first 
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seen in 1922.106 In addition to Heartfield’s montage, the issue contained an account of the 
Anti-Fascist Unity Congress in Berlin that year.107  
 
Figure 9. Die Rote Einheit macht euch frei!, 1932.  
 
Notably, the middle armband with the three downward arrows contained the sign 
of the Iron Front, an organization founded by Social Democrats for the sake of fighting 
fascism.108 Heartfield often used non-communist symbols to make derisive statements 
about other parties, but there was no sarcasm in this election montage. It proposed a 
united front on mutual, rather than Communist, terms. Earlier posters that targeted Social 
Democrats were underlined with a call for workers to join the KPD. This poster made no 
such plea. 
The exact motive that drove the AIZ to print this montage is hard to know for 
certain. Heartfield might have thought his election poster was acceptable propaganda 
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because of the very recent debate over the correct course. As recently as a month prior, 
party leaders had negotiated with SPD officials over united-front tactics.109 Perhaps, 
Heartfield had already finalized the montage and merely did not want to work on 
another.110 Moreover, Heartfield rarely used the formal symbol of the Communist Party 
that one sees here. The AIZ did not hide that this piece of propaganda was printed in order 
to aid the KPD in the upcoming election, but the poster still ran counter to the KPD’s 
current stance on the “Social Democrats.” Although there were others that opposed 
Thälmann and the Comintern’s return to “social fascism,” such as Neumann and 
Remmele, most of them had been purged from the KPD leadership. The Comintern and 
the KPD had come to an official consensus against united fronts and taken measures 
against those who disagreed with it, and yet, Heartfield disregarded these events. He 
chose to target the SPD-based readership of the AIZ to meet the demands of his 
propaganda, which was more crucial in the creation of this piece than the proper party 
line. He was willing to undermine short-term changes in KPD policy for the immediate 
need of a united front between the political factions of his viewership.  
These developments in 1932 again test the notion that German Communists were 
always in a subordinate position to the Comintern. The KPD briefly experimented with 
alternate politics in early 1932 but quickly came back in line. The AIZ, on the other hand, 
stayed its course after July. The magazine had autonomy under the IAH and did not have 
to uphold any obligation to satisfy the Comintern with the messages in its propaganda. 
None of the seventeen photomontages before the Communist Party ban in 1933 mocked 
the SPD. Most of them either focused on the corruption of Hitler and his Nazi Party or 
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the inadequacies of the Reichstag government. By this point, the AIZ was committed to 
exposing what it saw as harsh truths behind the Nazi facade or what the future would 
hold if Hitler’s party were to control Germany’s leadership.  
Antifascism became more of a necessity as the AIZ addressed their readers in 
1932. The NSDAP came out of the July elections as Weimar Germany’s leading party. 
Their share of the vote had skyrocketed from 18.3 percent in 1930 to 37.4 percent two 
years later. As well, the SPD continued to lose voters. It came out of the July 1932 
elections with only 21.6 percent, a 3.9 percent drop from their percentage in 1930. The 
Nazi Party was taking working-class voters from Berlin’s leftist parties.111 A month after 
these elections, Hitler was first offered a cabinet post in the German government.112  The 
disproportionate appearance of antifascist propaganda in Heartfield’s photomontages was 
a response to developments in the summer of 1932. The next couple of montages offer 
examples of this antifascism. In addition, they demonstrate Heartfield’s continued use of 
satirical devices that were part of why he became such an important propagandist in the 
first place. 
The AIZ used the news of Hindenburg’s cabinet offering in August 1932 to depict 
what ones sees in the example above: Hitler as a future authoritarian leader who would 
only exacerbate the economic conditions of the country. The montage was a portrait of 
Kaiser Wilhelm with a picture of Hitler, and it remains one of Heartfield’s most 
recognizable pieces (Figure 10). The short tagline, “Ich führe Euch herrlichen Pleiten 
entgegen!” (I lead you toward splendid bankruptcies!) was an altered version of the 
Kaiser’s slogan during World War I: “Ich führe Euch herrlichen Zeiten entgegen! (I lead 
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you toward splendid times!).113 Heartfield also called Hitler “S.M. ADOLF” (HIS 
MAJESTY ADOLF) to make the authoritarian link more apparent. The images followed 
this theme as Heartfield placed Hitler in the Kaiser’s wartime dress.114  
 
 
Figure 10. S.M. ADOLF, 1932. 
 
There was also an interesting use of hybridization here. The montage of Hitler in 
the Kaiser’s outfit evokes an immediate sense of contrast. The Nazi leader and the Kaiser 
were usually seen as incompatible, but by pasting them together, Heartfield suggested 
that they were not. He contended that Hitler was an authoritarian leader not unlike Kaiser 
Wilhelm.  
As Hitler inched closer to outright political control, Heartfield’s AIZ montages 
began to focus on the future dictator’s familiar image more and more. In Heartfield’s first 
two years at the AIZ, he did not set Hitler’s face in a single one of his photomontages. 
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Then from the beginning of 1932 to January of 1933, when Heartfield contributed his last 
piece to the magazine before it relocated to Prague, Hitler’s face appeared five times out 
of a total of twenty-two montages.115 This statistical number is small yet significant. 
Hitler became a regular feature of the magazine and its photomontages as AIZ readers 
abandoned the SPD or the KPD for the Nazi Party. Heartfield wanted to stop this trend. 
Another difference in 1932 was that the Social Democrats could not be found 
intermingled among this propaganda. Communists could no longer afford to exert their 
political energy on the SPD, which had lost many of the Reichstag seats it had. This 
change was noticeable in the AIZ photomontage patterns. 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Hitler und Hummel der gleiche Rummel, 1932.  
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Although not as well-known as the previous work, Heartfield placed Hitler next to 
Ignaz Karl Hummel, aka Oskar Daubmann, for a photomontage just three months later 
(Figure 11). Hummel was a con man who was celebrated as a nationalist hero by the 
radical right due to his experiences as a French prisoner of war in World War I.116 The 
poem and the side-by-side images of Hitler and Hummel established a historical parallel 
between the two men. The stanzas of the poem switched between the two figures, 
suggesting that Hitler was no better than the famous German criminal.117 The title of the 
piece equated the two men: “Hitler und Hummel der gleiche Rummel. (Hitler and 
Hummel, the same racket).118 The shortened legs in the montage were a less obvious 
example of metaphors of scale, another satirical device that Heartfield regularly used.119 
The size contrast between the top of the men’s’ bodies and their short legs drew an 
immediate connection to the well-known German phrase, “Lügen haben kurze Beine” 
(Lies have short legs). The depiction of this popular German phrase attempted to discredit 
Hitler by suggesting that his popularity, similar to that of the criminal Hummel, rested on 
a history of lies and deceit. 
Heartfield’s final montage for the Berlin-based AIZ is worth considering because 
of the political events that surrounded it and the appearance, yet again, of the 
Einheitsfront. Hitler was appointed chancellor on January 30, 1933, and three weeks 
later, the AIZ printed an issue that focused on the Reichstag and Prussian Landstag 
elections.120 Heartfield put together a montage for that issue that deviated from most of 
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his contributions to the AIZ in its aesthetic and lack of visual mockery. It resembled a 
movie poster or an advertisement more than any of his radical photomontages. There 
were no metaphors of scale or hybridization. Instead, it contained a basic photograph and 
noticeably more text than usual. The theme of the montage was explicitly spelled out in 
the words. Two men stood facing each other, one of them with his back turned (Figure 
12). The one the viewer could see had a distressed look on his face and was grabbing the 
other man by his shoulders, suggesting that he was trying to persuade the other man of 
something essential.121 The text superimposed over the image confirmed this notion. It 
said, “Vereint kämpfen! Schlieβt die Reihen gegen Faschismus und Reaktion! WÄHLT 
KOMMUNISTEN LISTE 3” (Fight united! Close ranks against fascism and reaction! 
Vote Communist List 3).122 Moreover, in the fine print at the top of the page, the words 
“Einheitsfront gegen Faschimsus” (united front against fascism) appeared. The AIZ 
proposed a united front when there was virtually no chance of one. Hitler was already 
chancellor and close to criminalizing all other parties.  
This montage was not necessarily in agreement with the KPD party line either. 
There were local initiatives between Social Democrats and Communists to combat 
against Nazi repression, but the KPD leadership never pursued a united-front alliance 
between the parties.123 Again, Heartfield created a united-front montage that defied the 
current party policy on the issue. The situation in early 1933, however, was 
overshadowed by the immediate danger Communist Berliners were in. Heartfield knew 
the severity of the situation and probably understood that his time at the AIZ was coming 
to an end.  
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Figure 12. Vereint kämpfen!, 1933.  
 
In these years leading up to Hitler’s chancellorship, Leon Trotsky had an almost 
obsessive fascination with Germany and the fate of communism within its borders. 
However, his commentary on it was not laudatory. He first voiced his distress in 1930 in 
an essay titled “The Turn in the Communist International and the Situation in Germany.” 
In this piece, written while he was in exile, he claimed that the ultra-left platform of the 
KPD would “ruin the German revolution.”124 He faulted the leadership of the party with a 
lack of ambition and blind disregard of Nazi power. Citing Die Rote Fahne, he stated that 
the Communists were convinced that fascism had entered the political scene at the wrong 
                                                
124 Leon Trotsky, “The Turn in the Communist International and the Situation in Germany,” trans. Morris 
Lewitt, Bulletin of Opposition, no. 17-8 (November-December 1930): 11, accessed February 10, 2014, 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/germany/1930/300926.htm.  
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time and would soon disappear. Trotsky demanded that the KPD disregard Moscow and 
pursue a true united front with the Social Democrats to defeat the NSDAP.125  
Then, in an article that he wrote for The Militant in 1932, he censured the KPD 
for its failure to form a united front in the last two years of the Weimar Republic. In an 
explicitly critical statement, Trotsky wrote, “There is no greater crime in politics than that 
of hoping for stupidities on the part of a strong enemy.”126 He was implying that the 
KPD’s continued theory of “social fascism” was wishful thinking. He was again warning 
the KPD of the increasing danger of a Nazi takeover and, in turn, urging the Communists 
to form a coalition with the leftist Social Democrats. Trotsky’s written rants might not 
have been extremely popular among German Communists in 1932 due to his exile from 
the Soviet Union and the KPD’s loyalty to Stalin, but he was an astute observer of the 
problems that plagued the KPD in the Weimar Republic’s last phase. Despite his exile, 
Trotsky verbalized something that few German Communists were willing to say. Putting 
aside the few fleeting attempts, the KPD failed to commit to this political approach that 
might have saved them from suffering at the hands of the Nazis in 1933.  
Trotsky’s warnings eerily foreshadowed the Nazi seizure of power, but more 
importantly, they alluded to the political discrepancy between the KPD and the IAH that 
emerged in 1932. He was right to accuse the KPD of failing to form a united-front 
alliance against fascism, but the IAH could not be faulted with the same oversight. The 
united front appeared twice in Heartfield photomontages in 1932, and both times it 
                                                
125 Trotsky, “Situation,” 11.  
126 Leon Trotsky, “The Impending Danger of Fascism in Germany,” trans. Einde O’Callaghan, The Militant 
5, no. 2 (January 1932): 2, accessed February 10, 2014, 
http://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1931/12/danger.htm.  
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challenged the KPD party line. Moreover, anti-SPD propaganda all but disappeared from 
his work in the AIZ in 1932.  
There remains potential for this project to serve as a starting aid for research and 
new methodological approaches. A social analysis and statistical breakdown of this 
diverse group of readers or an in-depth study of the commercial foundations of the 
illustrated press in Berlin could strengthen the contemporary understanding of this “mass 
medium.” As well, there is still room for the voice of Heartfield in the research. By 
tracking down the John Heartfield papers, this study could gain a new perspective of its 
most central historical character.  Until then, this examination will continue to function as 
it was first conceptualized. That is as an original contribution to the young historiography 
on this niche of Communist propaganda, and more generally, to a discourse on the 
relationship between art and politics in a modernizing society. 
Heartfield’s experiences after World War I and throughout the 1920s radicalized 
his art and politics. It was during these years that he invented the aesthetic of the 
photomontage that would overtake the diverse readership of the AIZ. Heartfield’s popular 
propaganda in this illustrated magazine was unrivalled by any formal propaganda that the 
KPD controlled. The photomontage transcended political posters and the party organ 
press through its aesthetic tradition, satirical devices, and broad appeal.  This widespread 
appeal of the AIZ photomontage reached its apex in 1932, the same year that the KPD 
clashed with the Comintern over a renewal of the united front. Heartfield’s striking 
election montage in July of that year undermined the KPD’s position once it had already 
come back in line with the Comintern.  
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Heartfield’s photomontage was, therefore, exemplary of a political clash among 
German Communists as the Weimar Republic approached its conclusion. The IAH had 
established an expansive leftist readership for the AIZ and found the perfect artist to reach 
it in Heartfield. The ability of his photomontage to creatively combine text and images in 
a new aesthetic allowed him to fit right into the IAH’s propaganda campaign starting in 
1929. Yet, Heartfield did not robotically promote Communist doctrine. Rather, he created 
propaganda that would satisfy the expansive audience of this independent organization. 
He prioritized the practical role of his artistic propaganda over following the party line at 
every turn. He had found the audience he sought out as a self-proclaimed political artist, 
and through an attempt to inspire that audience, he undermined the party line of the 
political organization he had belonged to for over a decade. Despite the IAH’s 
independent sphere, Heartfield had become a true propagandist and a cultural leader 
among German Communists. Therefore, his separation from party line could have 
exacerbated the internal conflict in the KPD.  
The Comintern was not behind the scenes, controlling the decisions of German 
Communists, as some historians have suggested, and it certainly did not restrain the work 
of Heartfield. He was a KPD member but still an independent radical artist and 
propagandist, who became most evident in July of 1932 when, of his own volition, he 
disregarded the party line and made what he thought was the right political decision.  
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